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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This case involves issues relating to the sale ofreal property, and the associated 
contracts and addenda. Appellants, James and Barbara Hilliard ("Hilliards") sued for 
declaratory and injunctive relief, asking for disbursement of the sum of $3,000,00.00 in 
sales proceeds held by Guaranty Title, Inc. Respondent Murphy Land Compnay, LLC 
("Murphy") counterclaimed, asking that the funds held be disbursed to it as damages for 
the time it did not have possession of the subject property. 
This appeal specifically seeks the review of an order for summary judgment entered 
by the Third District Court in favor of Murphy. 
B. Course of the Proceedings Below 
In December of 2010 the Hllliards sold real property located in Owyhee County to 
Murphy Land Company. Pending deletions of certain exceptions to the title insurance 
policy it was agreed that three million dollars ($3,000,000.00) of the purchase price would 
be held in escrow by the title insurance company (Guaranty Title). 
Subsequently, the exceptions to the title policy were deleted. The parties were 
unable to agree as to the disposition of the escrowed monies. The Hilliards filed a 
complaint seeking disbursement to them of the escrowed funds. Murphy Land Compnay 
filed an answer to the complaint and a counterclaim urging that it should receive the 
escrowed funds. 
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Murphy Land Company thereafter filed a Motion for Summary Judgment supported 
by the affidavit of one of the owners of Murphy Land Company (Frank Tiegs) seeking the 
court's award of the escrowed monies to it. The Hilliards responded to the Motion for 
Summary Judgment, supported in part by four (4) affidavits. Murphy objected to aspects of 
the Hilliards pro-offered affidavits and moved to strike and disregard portions of each of 
them. 
The Court heard Murphy's motion for summary judgment and heard argument on 
Murphy's motion to strike and disregard affidavit testimony pro-offered by the Hilliards on 
the same day. 
After oral argument, the Court granted in significant part Murphy's motion to strike 
and disregard the affidavit testimony pro-offered by the Hiliards. In addition, the Court 
accepted without more the affidavit testimony of Frank Tiegs on the part of Murphy as to 
the extent of the "damages". Notwithstanding, that Mr. Tiegs opined in his affidavit that 
Murphy's damages were in excess of three million dollars ($3,000,000.00) the Court 
granted summary judgment in that amount as the amount sought by Murphy's attorneys. 
Thereafter, the Hilliards filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment. The motion 
was resisted by Murphy and after briefing and argument, the Court denied the motion and 
subsequently awarded Murphy attorney fees and costs. 
This appeal follows. 
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C. Statement of the Facts 
James and Barbara Hilliard are husband and wife. For many years they owned a 
farm in Owyhee County, Idaho called Crystal Springs Farm. That farm was comprised of 
almost 4,000 acres. Approximately 3,000 acres are farmable. After they purchased the 
farm they leased to various farmers who grew row crops, such as potatoes and sugar beets, 
on their leased portions of that land. Also for many years the Billiards orally leased the 
remaining portions of the farmable land to John W. Clark who raised hay and grain crops 
thereon. During the 2009 and 2010 growing seasons the Hilliards leased row crop portions 
of that farm to Lance Funk,d.b.a. Lance Funk Farms, LLC. Also, during the 2009 growing 
season, the Billiards leased the remaining, non-row crop, portions of the farm to Jay P. 
Clark. 
In January 2010 Jay P. Clark, who also represented the Billiards as their lawyer in 
several other matters, obtained a written lease from the Billiards titled "Crop Share Lease 
2010" for Crystal Springs Farm which purported to give him a one-year lease, but was 
renewable at his sole option for a period of (10) years. On January 25, 2010 Jay P. Clark, 
without the Billiards' knowledge or consent, recorded that lease in Owyhee County, Idaho. 
On June 4, 2010, John W. Clark recorded a "Memorandum of Ownership Interest 
in Real Property" in Owyhee County wherein he claimed, under a purported oral 
agreement, to have a ten percent (10%) ownership interest in Crystal Springs Farm. That 
filing created a second cloud on the Billiards' title to Crystal Springs Farm. 
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During the fall of 2010 the Hilliards retained Robert F. Bennett to act as their 
realtor to sell Crystal Springs Farm. A short time later, they learned of the clouds on their 
title to that farm. Thereafter, prospective purchasers were informed of those clouds. 
When Mr. Bennett learned that Lance Funk, d.b.a. Lance Funk Farms, had leased the 
row crop portions of Crystal Springs Farm from the Hilliards during the two prior growing 
seasons,Mr. Bennett asked Mr. Funk whether he would be interested in purchasing that 
property. 
On November 5, 2010 James and Barbara Hilliard as Sellers and Lance Funk or 
Assignees as Buyer (Murphy Land Company, LLC of which Lance Funk is one of the 
principals become the assignee of Lance Funk, buyer) entered into a preprinted form 
agreement titled "RE-23 COMMERCIAL INVESTMENT REAL EST ATE PURCHASE 
AND SALE AGREEMENT' which provided for a $9,500,000 purchase price. The closing 
date for that transaction was to be December 28, 2010. 
On November 18, 2010 Pioneer Title Co. wrote to Guaranty Title enclosing it's 
commitment for the "Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement" of November 5, 2010. 
That commitment included Exceptions 32 and 33 which were for the clouds on the 
Hilliards' title to Crystal Springs Farm created by Jay P. Clark and John W. Clark. 
In mid-December, 2010 the Hilliards caused Jay P. Clark to be served with a Notice 
to Quit, but he ignored that notice and continued in possession of the Farm. However, he 
did sub-lease a portion thereof to an entity controlled by the principals of Murphy Land 
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Company, LLC. 
On December 28, 2010 the Hilliards and Lance Funk extended the closing date for 
the sale one day to December 29, 2010, but the transaction did not close on that day. 
On December 30, 2010 the Hilliards were unavailable to close the transaction and 
so they gave their son, James W. Hilliard, a power of attorney to sign a document titled 
"RE-11 ADDENDUM NO. 4" which required the Hilliards to deposit $3,000,000 of the 
purchase price with Guaranty Title, Inc. as Trustee. Those funds were to be held in trust 
pending an endorsement to Buyer's policy of title insurance deleting Exceptions Nos. 32 
and 33 shown on the commitment for title insurance. Those funds were to be "available to 
the extent determinedby a court of competent jurisdiction of the purchaser's damage, if 
any, for loss or delay of possession ofreal estate purchased herein." 
On February 16, 2011 the Hilliards sued Jay P. Clark and John W. Clark In Owyhee 
County to clear title to Crystal Springs Farm. On March 32, 2012 District Judge Culet 
entered an Order declaring Jay P. Clark's"Crop Share Lease 201 O" to be null and void and 
he expunged John W. Clark's "Memorandum of Ownership Interest in Real Property" from 
the records of Owyhee County. 
On March 29, 2012 First American Title Company deleted from the title insurance 
policy it had issued to Murphy Land Company, LLC the exceptions pertaining to the clouds 
Jay P. Clark and John W. Clark had placed on the Hilliards' title to Crystal Springs Farm. 
On May 2, 2012 Murphy Land Company, LLC obtained full possession of Crystal 
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Springs Farm. 
As set forth above this litigation follows. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When reviewing an order for summary judgment, the standard of review for the Supreme 
Court of Idaho is the same standard imposed upon the district court in ruling on the 
motion.1 
The entry of summary judgment is proper only when the pleadings, 
depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment 
as a matter oflaw.2 However, a mere scintilla of evidence or only slight doubt in opposition 
to the movant's position is not sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. 3 
Specifically, the nonmoving party must submit more than conclusory assertions that an 
issue of material fact exists to withstand summary judgment.4 In making the determination 
as to whether summary judgment is appropriate, when there is conflicting evidence 
concerning material issues, all allegations of fact in the record, and all reasonable 
1 Watson v. Weick, 141 Jdaho 500,504, 112 P.3d 788, 792 (2005). 
2 Idaho R. Civ. P. 56{c). 
3 Finholt v. Cresto, 143 Idaho 894,897, 155 P.3d 695,698 (2007). 
4 Id. at 896-97, 155 P.3d at 697-98. 
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inferences from the record, are construed in the light most favorable to the party opposing 
the summary judgment motion.5 However, when the trier of fact would be the district 
judge, and not a jury, the judge may grant summary judgment on undisputed evidentiary 
facts, despite conflicting inferences, because the court alone will be responsible for 
choosing those inferences.6 In such cases, where a judge exercises that power, it should 
make findings to identify the inferences drawn or rejected, and identify the evidentiary 
facts upon which its decision is based. 7 Finally, "if the credibility of an affiant furnishing 
direct evidence is put at issue by other, circumstantial evidence, the credibility issue should 
not be resolved on summary judgment."11 "Summary judgment is not proper when the 
relevant pleadings, depositions, and affidavits raise any question of the credibility of 
witnesses. "9 
On appeal, this Court exercises free review in determining whether a genuine issue 
of material fact exists and whether the moving party was and is entitled to judgment as a 
5 Brewer v. Washington RSA No. 8 Ltd. Partnership 145 Idaho 735, at 735-36, 184 P.3d 860, 863 (2008). 
6 Argyle v. Slemaker, 107 Idaho 668,670,691 P.2d 1283, 1285 (Ct. App, 1984) citing Riverside 
Development Co. v. Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515, 650 P.2d 657 (1982). 
7 Blackmon v. Zufelt, 108 Idaho 469,471; 700 P.2d 91, 93 (Ct. App. 1985); citing Argyle v. Slemaker, 107 
Idaho 668,691; P.2d 1283, 1305 (Ct. App. 1984). 
s Id. 
9 Smith v. Idaho State Univ. Fed. Credit Union, 103 Idaho 245,247; 646 P.2d 1016, 1018 (Ct. App. 1982), 
citing Straley v. Idaho Nuclear Com., 94 Idaho 917,918; 500 P.2d 218,219 (1972). 
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matter of law. 10 
A. 
B. 
C. 
fact and 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Did the District Court improperly weigh the evidence and assess the 
credibility of witnesses? 
Did the District Court fail to construe disputed facts in favor of the 
non-moving party? 
Did the District Court fail to support its judgment with findings of 
conclusions of law? 
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
Attorneys fees and costs are specifically provided for in real estate sale agreement, 
and should be awarded to Hilliards pursuant to the contract between the parties. 11 
In the alternative, Hilliards should be awarded their attorneys fees and costs pursuant to 
LC.§§ 12-120 and 12-121. It is well-established law before this Court "that LC. §12-120 
mandates an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party on appeal as well as at trial."12 
Appellants should be awarded their reasonable attorneys fees and costs incurred in 
this appeal. 
10 Ada County v. Fuhnnan, 140 Idaho 230,232, 91 P.3d 1134, 1136 (2004). 
11 R., Supp., pp. 19-30. 
12 Chavez v. Barrus 146 Idaho 212,225, 192 P.3d 1036, 1049 (2008)., citing Cox v. Mulligan, 142 Idaho 
356, 359, 128 P.3d 893, 896 (2005). 
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ARGUMENT 
A. Did the District Court improperly weigh the evidence and assess 
credibility of witnesses? 
This Court has previously held that motions for summary judgment should be 
granted with caution. 13 This is because of the nature of summary judgment, which with 
absolute finality, curtails the litigation and effectively denies a party the right to have a full 
trial. Summary judgment is granted only in the narrowest of circumstances where the 
record before the trial court contains no conflicting facts from which reasonable minds 
might reach different conclusions. 14 In other words, if there is more than one conclusion 
which a reasonable person could draw from the facts and record presented to the judge 
sitting in summary judgment, such a case is not appropriate for summary judgment and all 
claims and issues should be reserved for resolution by the finder of fact at trial. 
Idaho's appellate courts have addressed the prohibition against assessing the 
credibility of witnesses at the summary judgment stage on numerous occasions. The Idaho 
Supreme Court has unequivocally stated that "[a] motion for summary judgment should be 
denied if the pleadings, admissions, depositions, and affidavits raise any question of 
credibility of witness or weight of the evidence."15 
13 Bonz v. Sudweeks, 119 Idaho 539,541,808 P.2d 876,878 (1991); 
14 Kline v. Clinton 103 Idaho 116, 645 P.2d 350 (1982). 
15 Merrill v. Duffy Reed Constr. Co., 82 Idaho 410,414; 353 P.2d 647,659 (1960). 
12 
The district court initially struck the affidavit of Billiards' expert, Ken Edmunds, 
based upon late disclosure, and lack of foundation to support his opinions. 16 In so doing, 
the district court failed to properly consider the fact that Edmunds was identified as a 
rebuttal witness, after Murphy identified Frank Tiegs as its expert. Murphy's disclosure 
deadline was October 25, 2013; Hilliards identified Edmunds on October 29, 2013. 
Murphy did not file any objection to the disclosure of Edmunds until it filed its Motion to 
Strike on December 5, 2013, eight days before the hearing on Murphy's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. The district court abused its discretion when it failed to recognize 
that even though Edmunds may have been excluded from testifying in Billiards' case-in-
chief, he could have properly testified in Hilliards' rebuttal case. 17 Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure l(a) states that the "rules shall be liberally construed to secure the just, speedy 
and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding." The relevant inquiry, as 
the Idaho Supreme Court has stated, should be whether or not the interests of justice are 
served. 18 At the summary judgment stage, it was an abuse of discretion to exclude 
Edmunds' testimony, and to fail to consider it on its own merit. Here, the district court 
clearly looked at "foundational issues." It used them to criticize and exclude the facts 
16 Tr., pp. 30-31. 
17 See, e.g. McDonald v. Safeway Stores, 109 Idaho 305; 707 P.2d 416 (1985). 
18 See Edmunds v. Kraner, 142 Idaho 867, 873, 136 P.3d 338, 334 (2006). 
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considered and opinions held by Edmund in essence weighing the evidence.12 Moreover, 
in evaluating the Edmunds affidavit, the district court weighed his opinions and credibility 
against those submitted by Murphy's expert, Frank Tiegs,20 The district court allowed 
Tiegs to testify without requiring either supporting documents or foundation, but struck 
testimony from Edmunds on those bases. Indeed, it held all of Hilliards' witnesses to a 
higher standard than it held Tiegs and other Murphy witnesses. In Nield v. Pocatello 
Health Services,21 the Idaho Supreme Court found that the district court had impermissibly 
relied upon statements contained in one expert's report in making its determination that 
another expert's report was inadequate, utilizing the first expert's affidavit as a yardstick 
against which the second expert's opinions were measured. The Supreme Court found held 
the district court had abused its discretion, and vacated the summary judgment.22 
The district court's evaluation of the affidavit of Jay Clark is even more 
problematic. The court made it clear on the record that it weighed his summary judgment 
affidavit against his affidavit from another case and found them to be inconsistent, and that 
it further evaluated Clark's credibility based upon his actions in the prior case: 
"There has been testimony rendered by Mr. Clark, pursuant to those affidavits. And 
19 See Hines v. Hines. 129 Idaho 847. 934 P.2d 20 (1997). 
20 See, Tr., pp. 31-34. 
21 
__ Idaho __ ; __ P.3d. __ (2014, Docket No. 38823-2011, 2014 Opinion No. 20). 
22 Id. 
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the Court is entitled to view that testimony in the fashion that it has been given. The Court 
finds that there is simply conflicting testimony about Mr. Clark's willingness to allow these 
individuals on the land, and that is evidenced as as indicated in the affidavit ..... But the 
Court is allowed to assess credibility, and the Court simply finds that based on those two 
affidavits, as to that very narrow factual issue, the Court did not find Mr. Clark to be 
credible about his willingness to allow the other individuals to enter the farm and/or to take 
possession of the farm to engage in farming that -the purpose for which the farm was 
purchased. ,m 
The district court struck portions of Clark's affidavit because "the reason that he 
knew the facts ... is that he was unwilling to vacate the property, despite being told to do 
so."24 The court refused to allow Clark's testimony regarding farming in 2011 and 2012 
because "[i]t has been determined that he was wrongfully in possession of that property 
during that time frame.ms 
The Idaho appellate courts have specifically found this sort of analysis to be 
inappropriate in the summary judgment context: 
Difficulties in remembering relevant facts, and the giving of 
contradictory testimony are factors to be considered in determining a 
witness' credibility. Summary judgment is not proper when the relevant 
23 Tr., pp. 123-125 (emphasis added) 
24 Tr., p. 38, 11. 15-18. 
25 Tr., p. 37, II. 1-9. 
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pleadings, depositions, and affidavits raise any question of the credibility of 
witnesses .... In summary judgment proceedings the facts are to be 
liberally construed in favor of the party opposing the motion, who is also to 
be given the benefit of all favorable inferences which might reasonably 
drawn from the evidence. Applying this rule to a case where, as here, an 
issue has been raised concerning the credibility of a key witness, we hold 
that summary judgment is inappropriate. 26 
The Idaho appellate courts have long held that the proper method to determine a 
witnesses' credibility is by testimony in court before the trier of fact. The district court 
impermissibly weighed evidence and made credibility determinations at the summary 
judgment stage, abusing her discretion, and under these circumstances, summary judgment 
cannot lie. 
B. The District Court Failed to Construe Disputed Facts in Favor of the 
Non-moving Party. 
While acknowledging that Clark had knowledge regarding damages in the action, 
the Court refused to consider the facts he testified to, including his work preparing the 
ground for planting for the 2012 season, stating, "[y]es, but the reason that he knew the 
facts that predicated Bis that he was unwilling to vacate the property, despite being told to 
do so."27 The district court then went on to say, "the fact that Mr. Clark may have prepared 
the land does not refute the [sic] paragraph 11. So the Court is going to strike that first 
26 Smith v. Idaho State Univ. Fed. Credit Union, 103 Idaho 245,247; 646 P.2d 1016, 1018 (Ct. 
App. 1982) 
27 Tr., p. 38, II. 15-18. 
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sentence."28 Clearly, the district court misunderstood both its powers to determine 
admissible evidence, and its duties under the standard for summary judgment. Instead of 
properly construing disputed facts in favor of Hilliards, it haphazardly struck portions of 
Hilliards affidavits, and, as argued supra, weighed them against the Tiegs Affidavit. 
The district court seemed to misunderstand what is meant by drawing inferences 
favorable to the moving party in a summary judgment setting, where the district court will 
be in the ultimate finder of fact. In Land O'Lakes, Inc. v. Brav,29 the Idaho Court of 
Appeals stated: 
The legal standard allowing a trial court presented with a sun1mary 
judgment motion to draw inferences favorable to the movant is to be applied 
only in the face of undisputed facts. When evidence on material issues is in 
conflict, the evidentiary facts must be viewed in favor of the party opposing 
the motion. 
Contrary to this standard, the district court believed it was "allowed to assess 
credibility" and then stated "the Court did not find Mr. Clark to be credible."30 The court 
relied upon its assessment of Mr. Clark in finding his affidavit did not raise a factual 
question regarding Murphy's damages.31 The court summarily dismissed Clark's 
testimony that he was ready, willing and able to rent the property, which would have 
28 Tr., p. 40, II. 21-24. 
29 138 Idaho 817; 69 P.3d I 078 (Ct. App. 2003). 
30 Tr., p. 123, II. 19-20; p. 124, II. 19-25 
31 See Tr., pp. 116-118; Tr. P. Tr., pp. 44-46. 
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mitigated Murphy's damages,32 balancing that testimony against a prior affidavit by him in 
a previous case. The duty to mitigate requires a party who is injured by another to take 
reasonable steps to lessen his or her damages.33 Hilliards have argued that Murphy could 
have mitigated its damages by renting the farm from Clark, and Murphy argued that was 
not a reasonable remedy. However, "the reasonableness of the method selected to 
minimize damages is an issue to be resolved by the jury [or the trier of fact]."34 . The 
district court also failed to consider Clark's testimony regarding historic yields and 
preparation of the ground for the 2012 planting season, all of which would have bearing on 
Murphy's damages.35 For purposes of summary judgment, these facts must be construed 
most favorably to Hilliards, which the district court failed to do 
The district court failed to hold Murphy to the proper standard regarding damages. 
While recognizing that there may be factual disputes regarding Murphy's claim, 36 the court 
failed to properly consider those issues. Hilliards argued that Murphy's damage claims are 
both speculative and inaccurate. Certainly, had the district court not seen fit to disregard 
32 Tr., p. 116, IL 16-20. 
33 D. Dobbs, Remedies, §3.7. at 186 (1973). See also Casey v. Nampa & Meridian Irrigation Dist., 85 
Idaho 299, 305; 379 P.2d 409, 412 (/963) 
34 Davis v. First Interstate Bank, N.A., 115 Idaho 169, 170; 765 P.2d 681,681 (1988). 
35 Tr., pp. 36-38. 
36 Tr.,pp.114-118. 
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and/or exclude Hilliards' evidence, there is ample support to conclude that Frank Tiegs' 
cost and revenue projections are speculative, and that Murphy's damages were much lower 
than Tiegs estimated. It is interesting to note that while the district court required 
Hilliards' affiants to have supporting data and foundational documents in order for their 
testimony to be considered, it did not hold Murphy's expert, Tiegs, to the same standard. 
Mr. Tiegs qualifies his "projections" throughout his affidavit with language like "I would 
expect," and "I estimate." Certainly at trial Mr. Tiegs would have been asked to compare 
his "estimates" with actual yields during the 2013 growing season, when Murphy had 
possession of the premises for the entire season. Factual questions regarding Murphy's 
damage claim abound, and it was improper for the district court to grant summary 
judgment on that issue. 
It was not the duty of the trial court sitting in summary judgment to make factual 
determinations where facts were in conflict. The function of the trial court is not to weigh 
the evidence or to try the factual issues; the trial court's only duty in determining a 
summary judgment motion is to determine whether or not there exists any genuine material 
fact as adduced from the entire record. 37 
C. The District Court Failed to Support its Summary Judgment Grant 
With Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Particularly Regarding its Exercise of 
37 Kline, 103 Idaho at 121, 645 P.2d at 355. 
19 
the Ritchie Power. 
Idaho's appellate courts have held that if a judge exercises the power granted to it 
under Riverside Development Co. v. Ritchie,38 which holds that a judge, sitting without a 
jury, is not constrained to draw inferences in favor of the party opposing a motion for 
summary judgment, it should make findings to identify the inferences drawn or rejected, 
and to identify the evidentiary facts upon which the decision is based. 39 
In this case, the district court made no such findings. In fact, review of the Courts 
findings and statements on the record lead to the inescapable conclusion that it failed to 
understand the limits on discretion, and believed that it not only had the right to draw 
inferences in favor of Murphy, but to weigh the evidence and determine the credibility of 
witnesses as well. 
The trial court failed to identify what inferences it had drawn or rejected. It also failed to 
identify the evidentiary facts upon which its decision was based, other than to state that 
Billiards had failed to "sufficiently refute" the amount of damages alleged.40 
CONCLUSION 
In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, the court must look to 
38 103 Idaho 515,650 P.2d 657 (1982). 
39 Blackmon v. Zufelt, 108 Idaho 469,471; 700 P.2d 91, 93 (Ct. App. 1983), citing Argyle v. Slemaker, 
107 Idaho 668,692; P.2d 1283 (Ct. App 1983). 
40 Tr., p. 117, II. 20-25. 
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the totality of the motions, affidavits, depositions, pleadings and attached exhibits, not 
merely to portions of the record in isolation.41 The summary judgment issued in this case 
was issued after the trial court improperly eviscerated the affidavits filed by Hilliards, and 
was predicated on the district court's determination that one of Hilliards' witness was not 
credible. The core problem with this case is that was that it was not an appropriate 
candidate for summary judgment. The district court failed to recognize that there were a 
number of controverted facts which should have precluded entry of summary judgment, 
and needed to be resolved at trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of October, 2014. 
M. KARL SHURTLIFF 
WELDON S. WOOD 
Attorneys for Appellants 
41 Anderson v. City of Pocatello, 112 Idaho 176, 731 P.2d 171 (1986) 
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